The unreported decision in Howe v Howe [2025] deserves closer attention than it has so far received.

It is the latest in a line of post-Ilott decisions that are quietly clarifying what “something more” actually looks like when an adult child claims under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, and it reinforces a pattern that both litigators and estate planners need to take seriously.

The Facts

Roger Howe, a pirate radio engineer, died on 27 March 2020 after falling from a window. His estate was valued at approximately £1.4 million. His Will, dated 4 July 2017, left everything to his mother, sister, and two nephews. His adult daughter, Jenna Howe, aged 37, was entirely excluded. The Will described her in disparaging terms, “lazy” and “druggy.”

Jenna’s life circumstances at the date of the hearing were difficult. Her housing was funded by the local authority. She carried personal debts, had health needs including the need for therapy, and had limited income. She was, in practical terms, financially vulnerable.

Jenna sought £450,000 under the 1975 Act. The court awarded £125,000, structured as a discretionary trust.

The Court’s Analysis

The court applied the familiar two-stage test under the 1975 Act. First, had the Will failed to make reasonable financial provision for the claimant? Second, if so, what order should the court make?

On the first question, the court found that the Will had indeed failed to make reasonable provision. Despite the deceased’s expressed reasons for excluding Jenna, her financial circumstances were such that the absence of any provision from a substantial estate was unreasonable.

On the critical question of “something more”, the threshold established in Re Coventry [1980] 1 Ch 461, which requires an adult child to demonstrate additional factors beyond the bare parent-child relationship, the court identified a causation-based argument linking Jenna’s current financial need to her father’s conduct during her upbringing:

1. Parental neglect and its consequences. Jenna successfully argued that her father’s neglect during her adolescence caused her drug use and subsequent life difficulties. The court accepted the causal link between historical parental conduct and the claimant’s present financial circumstances.
2. Financial vulnerability. Jenna’s housing was local authority-funded, she carried personal debts, and she had ongoing health needs. Her financial position at the date of the hearing was plainly precarious.
3. The moral obligation arising from parental conduct. The court found that Roger Howe’s neglect of his daughter during her formative years gave rise to a continuing obligation, one that survived his death and that the 1975 Act was designed to address where testamentary provision had not been made.

The award of £125,000 was structured to cover specific needs: paying debts, funding essential purchases such as a car and white goods, providing for health needs including therapy and necessary breast implants, and covering an income shortfall over a ten-year period. The court rejected Jenna’s claim for accommodation assistance on the basis that her housing was already funded by the local authority.

Conduct and Its Limits

Two features of the case deserve particular attention from practitioners.

First, Jenna’s own conduct did not defeat the claim. She had a harassment conviction against one of her father’s executors, and she had pursued an unsuccessful probate challenge that resulted in approximately £42,000 in legal costs, costs that were partially covered by her eventual inheritance award. The court treated these matters as relevant but not determinative. The harassment conviction was a factor, but it was weighed against the historical parental neglect that the court found had contributed to Jenna’s circumstances. The unsuccessful probate costs were addressed practically, as part of the overall provision.

Second, the deceased’s disparaging characterisation of Jenna in the Will, describing her as “lazy” and “druggy”, did not insulate the estate from a successful claim. The court assessed the objective reasonableness of the provision (or lack of it), rather than simply deferring to the testator’s expressed reasons for exclusion.

Placing Howe in Context: The “Something More” Line of Authority

The “something more” requirement has its origin in Re Coventry [1980], where Oliver J held that an adult child cannot succeed under the 1975 Act simply by virtue of the parent-child relationship. Something additional is needed, some factor or combination of factors that makes the absence of provision unreasonable.

For nearly four decades, the difficulty has been defining what that “something” is. The case law has developed incrementally, and Howe sits at the latest point on that trajectory.

Ilott v The Blue Cross [2017] UKSC 17

The Supreme Court’s decision in Ilott remains the leading authority on adult child claims. Mrs Ilott had been estranged from her mother for 26 years. The estate, worth approximately £486,000, was left entirely to animal charities. Mrs Ilott was living on state benefits.

The Supreme Court restored the district judge’s original award of £50,000. The “something more” was, in essence, extreme financial need. But the award was strikingly modest relative to the estate, roughly ten per cent, and the court made clear that testamentary freedom, the length of the estrangement, and the maintenance standard all operated as limiting factors.

Ilott confirmed two propositions that remain central. First, an adult child is limited to what is reasonably required for maintenance. Second, the court will not lightly override a testator’s clearly expressed wishes, particularly where the testator had reasons for the distribution chosen.

The Post-Ilott Pattern

In the years since Ilott, a pattern has emerged in the county court and High Court decisions that have applied the “something more” test. Both successful and unsuccessful claims are instructive.

In Nahajec v Fowle [2017], an adult daughter was awarded £30,000 from an estate of approximately £265,000. The deceased’s conduct, described as “stubborn and intransigent”, was found to be at fault for the estrangement. The combination of the deceased’s culpability for the breakdown and the daughter’s financial need was sufficient to establish “something more.”

In Rochford v Rochford [2021] (unreported), the claimant had received a legacy of £25,000 from an estate valued at approximately £193,000. Despite this existing provision, the court made an additional award of £85,000. The key factors were the claimant’s disability and an ongoing income shortfall. Rochford demonstrates that even where a testator has not entirely excluded the claimant, existing provision may still fall below the maintenance standard where disability and financial need combine.

In Higgins v Morgan [2021], a stepson was awarded £40,800, together with a 14,200 pound contribution towards his success fee under a conditional fee agreement. The substantive award is noteworthy as one of the few successful stepchild claims. However, the costs element has been overtaken by the Supreme Court’s decision in Hirachand v Hirachand [2024] UKSC 43, which held that success-fee contributions in 1975 Act proceedings are no longer recoverable from the estate. Practitioners should note that the Higgins costs order would not be replicated today: the effect of Hirachand is that CFA success fees are borne by the claimant, which has practical implications for funding decisions in marginal claims.

In Fennessy v Turner [2022], an adult son, Patrick Neil Fennessy, succeeded on the basis of disability, financial vulnerability, and the deceased’s assurances of provision. He was awarded £177,500 from an estate of approximately £360,000 (with a top up for the success fee, now impossible after Hirachand). His disability and low income, combined with accommodation needs and the assurances that had been made, grounded a moral obligation that the court enforced.

In Isaacs v Green [2025], 74-year-old David Isaacs succeeded in his claim and was awarded £150,000, 25 per cent of his mother’s residuary estate. This January 2025 decision is another example of the courts’ increasing receptiveness to adult child claims where genuine financial need is demonstrated.

Where Claims Have Failed

Not every adult child claim succeeds, and the unsuccessful cases illustrate the limits of the “something more” test.

In Miles v Shearer [2021], the claim was dismissed. The claimant was unable to demonstrate a maintenance need of the kind that would justify overriding the testator’s clearly expressed wishes. The case is a reminder that financial independence, or at least the absence of proven financial need, remains a significant obstacle to adult child claims, however strained the family relationship may have been.

In Batstone v Batstone [2022], the court again found that the claimant had not established “something more.” The claim failed for want of the combination of factors that the successful cases consistently demonstrate: identifiable obligation on the part of the deceased and genuine, evidenced financial need on the part of the claimant.

These decisions are important counterweights to the successful claims. The post-Ilott trend does not mean that adult child claims have become easy. The court continues to require concrete evidence of both moral obligation and maintenance need, and claims that rest on little more than the fact of the parent-child relationship and a sense of unfairness will fail.

The thread running through these decisions is clear. The “something more” is most readily established where the claimant can point to factors, contributions, caring responsibilities, parental culpability, disability, assurances, that create a moral obligation on the part of the deceased, combined with financial need that makes the absence of provision unreasonable.

What Howe Adds to the Post-Ilott Landscape

Howe v Howe is significant for three reasons.

First, it reinforces that causation-based arguments, linking current financial need to historical parental conduct, are a viable route to establishing “something more.” Where a claimant can demonstrate that a parent’s neglect or abandonment during their upbringing caused or materially contributed to their present financial difficulties, the court may treat this as creating a continuing obligation that survives the parent’s death. This is a distinct category of “something more,” separate from the contribution-based arguments seen in cases involving care or business involvement.

Second, Howe illustrates the limits of testamentary language as a defence. Roger Howe’s Will explicitly characterised Jenna in negative terms, but this did not prevent the court from finding that the Will failed to make reasonable provision. The court looks at the objective reality of the claimant’s circumstances, not simply at the testator’s characterisation of the claimant. Disparaging language in a Will may in fact prove counterproductive if it appears disproportionate or self-serving.

Third, the decision confirms that the maintenance standard, while a genuine constraint, does not prevent meaningful awards where the factual basis is strong. The estate in Howe was substantial, approximately £1.4 million, but the award of £125,000 was carefully directed at identified needs rather than constituting a general share of the estate. The court rejected the larger claim of £450,000, demonstrating that the maintenance standard continues to operate as a meaningful limit, but within that limit the court will address genuine needs comprehensively.

Practical Implications

For Litigators

The evidential lesson from Howe is significant. In claims where the adult child’s present financial difficulties are said to result from the deceased’s parenting failures, the quality of the evidence supporting the causal link will often determine the outcome. Medical records, social services records, expert evidence going to the connection between childhood experiences and adult outcomes, and contemporaneous correspondence are all potentially critical. A vague assertion that the claimant had a difficult childhood will not carry the same weight as documented evidence of specific neglect and its measurable consequences.

Practitioners advising potential claimants should also note the court’s willingness to factor in prior litigation costs: Jenna’s unsuccessful probate challenge costs of approximately £42,000 were partially addressed within the overall award. This has practical implications for how prior failed litigation is presented in subsequent 1975 Act claims.

Equally, those defending claims on behalf of estates should not assume that a testator’s stated reasons for exclusion will carry determinative weight. The court will form its own assessment of the circumstances, and a testator’s characterisation of a claimant in a Will is evidence, not a conclusion.

On funding, the decision in Hirachand v Hirachand [2024] UKSC 43 has materially altered the costs landscape for 1975 Act claims. Before Hirachand, claimants could seek a contribution towards their CFA success fee from the estate, as was ordered in Higgins v Morgan. That route is now closed. The practical consequence is that claimants pursuing claims on a conditional fee arrangement will bear the full success fee themselves, which may reduce the net benefit of any award and should inform early advice on the merits and proportionality of litigation.

For Estate Planners

Howe carries a clear warning for testators and their advisers. Where a parent has been absent or neglectful during a child’s upbringing, and that child is now financially vulnerable, a Will that leaves the child without provision carries a material risk of a successful claim under the 1975 Act, even if the testator has expressed reasons for the exclusion.

This does not mean that every testator must leave their estate equally between their children. Testamentary freedom remains a weighty consideration. But it does mean that a testator who wishes to exclude an adult child should do so with eyes open. A carefully prepared statement of reasons under section 21 of the Administration of Justice Act 1982 is advisable. Even then, the statement will not bind the court, but it may influence the weight given to testamentary freedom in the balancing exercise. And the statement should address the objective circumstances rather than simply reciting negative characterisations.

Conclusion

Howe v Howe is a useful marker of where the law has arrived. The “something more” threshold for adult child claims is no longer the opaque standard it once appeared. The post-Ilott cases, taken together, show a court system that is increasingly clear about what it is looking for: factors that ground a moral obligation, combined with financial need that makes the absence of provision unreasonable.

The route to “something more” is not confined to any single category. It may be established through contributions of labour or care, through the deceased’s culpability for estrangement, through disability and assurances, or, as Howe demonstrates, through the causal consequences of parental neglect. What unites the successful cases is a combination of identifiable obligation and genuine need. Equally, the unsuccessful claims, Miles v Shearer, Batstone v Batstone, confirm that the threshold remains real: the court will not make provision simply because a testator’s choices seem harsh.

For adult children who find themselves excluded from a Will, Howe is a reminder that the court will look beyond the testator’s stated reasons to the underlying reality. For testators and their advisers, it is a reminder that obligations incurred during life do not necessarily end at death, and that the 1975 Act remains the mechanism by which the court will, where appropriate, enforce them.

This article is for general information only and does not constitute legal advice. Every case turns on its own facts. If you require advice on a specific situation, please contact Fifty Six Law directly.